The Humanitarian Triad

By Raymond Apthorpe

As humanitarian studies gather pace and volume, perhaps to begin with as a distinct sub-area within international affairs, international relations, and development studies, some distinctive concepts and methods of analysis will be required, not least to determine the morality – and immorality – of material and immaterial action proposed or actually taken across borders in the name of humanity, brought up now for evaluation.  First, obviously, a conceptual elaboration is needed of what we might call ‘morality-in-practice’.  Second, a dimensioning of humanitarian praxis which among other things can facilitate a consequentialist approach to be taken towards judging the morality-in-practice of an intervention with attention paid to its outcomes as well as its aims and methods.

What humanitarian is, may not be completely reducible to what humanitarian does, but for humanitarian praxis concerns that surely is a core mantra regarding for example the delivery and distribution of emergency goods and services to an afflicted population, particularly as these are experienced by the intended receivers and those equally in need but not served.  Absolutely, what humanitarian does is what overwhelmingly matters when it comes to inquiring as to what difference such assistance makes, or fails to make, with negatives as well as positives to appraise.  What in other regards it might ‘mean’, say normatively, is another thing altogether in abstract theory unrelated to praxis. 

In four lectures given during my visit to Bjørknes University College, and particularly the lecture that was hosted at PRIO (jointly also with Bjørknes University College and the Norwegian Centre for Humanitarian Studies), what (perhaps provisionally) I term ‘The humanitarian triad’ was pleased to make its first public appearance. I conceive of that as a step on the way towards, so to say, getting a handle on the morality-in-practice of humanitarian intervention.  What is it? In short, a tripartite proposition, expressed in Just War language, that humanitarian intervention can possibly be moral-in-practice only if what is involved is three fold: a just cause, addressed by a just method, ending in a just outcome.

Fail any one of these tests, but arguably (in consequentialist terms) the third above all, and there could even be a case for the interveners to have a criminal charge to face in the Hague, as well as a burden of immorality to bear. It is not enough simply to have a just cause to take up, perhaps even by force of arms and despite all the head- and heart-searching that always goes along with decisions to be made about the risks and use of lethal weapons. It is no validation of civil action simply to eschew – when it does - armed intervention. If you can’t with reasonable confidence forecast the consequences of an intervention where is the morality-in-practice, but instead just go on (however wittily) about ‘stuff happens’ especially when evidently things are not turning out to your liking, where is the  morality-in-practice of going to war, or going to aid, in the first place? ‘Nowhere’ says the humanitarian triad, ‘nowhere at all’.

In these four lectures the focus is particularly on what I term ‘civil humanitarian intervention’ – such as an emergency relief aid programme across borders, invited normally though such is after a negotiation process in which conditions are imposed and other special provision made, to be delivered by an INGO primarily on behalf of itself and its donors. Normally the ‘humanitarian intervention’ expression tout court connotes not an INGO doing or attempting doing something, but a military body acting forcibly as directed by a government (and normally without an invitation so to say to trespass). So here already comes one problem for humanitarian studies. Compared with what is known about just causes across borders and the governments that take them up or not, other than in a few cases practically nothing is known, publicly that is, about INGOs and which just causes they take up or not, when and why, and so forth.

Clearly the sooner that is researched the better. Why not check that out with any friendly INGO near you and report back.

Another conundrum (to be researched) is that while as a rule (but definitely not always) INGOs abhor having any relationship with a military, the means to intervene which INGO’s consider to be just are seldom spelled out. Usually in this respect there will be very little for humanitarian studies to go by other than claims that today’s absolutely urgent humanitarian emergency is even worse than yesterday’s, that the principal thing is simply ‘to help’ where possible with the resources available, and to get on with that job without further delay. Admittedly along with such ‘helping’ as is well known goes ‘triage’ and ‘targeting’, and affirmations about the codes of ethics required for impartial and neutral  practice and the importance of the ‘partnership’ to which they have signed up. But little else. And unless I am mistaken (check  that out) not even either of those two features has been seriously researched other than in a case or two whether cross-culturally or otherwise as to their morality-in-practice.

Here then come two further areas for urgent research: one, to determine just exactly what is such ‘helping’, as it is actually approached and undertaken what it can achieve as an intervention; two, to establish to what extent the codes of practice to which INGOs have signed up are necessary and sufficient to be effective ‘on the ground’ either for emergency relief assistance that is meant to succour, or for human rights protection meant to show solidarity, or both, or neither.   

Of our triad of graces for humanitarian studies it is, however, just outcome that currently is the most difficult even to talk about with any authority, not outcomes during or after an intervention, but what in advance can be reasoned to be its most likely outcomes and impacts. For carrying out ex post factum evaluation, guidance abounds, for ex ante there is practically none. Until this lacuna is remedied ‘stuff happens’ escapology will only continue to be able to rule unopposed. Stop that! 

    

Finally, about the justice of international justice at large and what can be learned from the workings of the ICJ and its outcomes, arguably there are morality-in-practice questions to ask of those too given as has been reported what it has to work as it goes its business is not an unproblematic integration of ‘anglo-saxon’ common law with ‘roman law’ ideas and procedures, but something closer in some regards to an unstable, and unreliable, fractured conjuncture.  

In short, friends, a sea of humanitarian studies dissertation topics awaits you, all of which you will find to be remarkably doable provided only that first you define them down to one or two essentials, then rise confidently to their challenges! Best wishes and good luck.  

About Raymond Apthorpe

Dr. Apthorpe is Vice President of Council at the Royal Anthropological Institute, London; Honorary Professorial Research Associate at SOAS, University of London;  Advisory Associate at the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague Erasmus University, and is taking up a visiting professorship at the London School of Economics next month. In his former capacity at the Australian National University (ANU) where he held classes on international humanitarian assistance in an ANU – Bjørknes – PRIO graduate programme in international affairs. Raymond has long been one of the leading scholars examining the policies and practices of humanitarian and development assistance, including extensive involvement with evaluations of a large humanitarian programmes. Previous affiliations with different UN agencies in Geneva, Taiwan and the Philippines, and extensive fieldwork in East and West Africa (11 years) doing research and university teaching.

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